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TOWARD A THEORY OF BUSINESS LEVEL STRATEGY RESEARCH 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to call for sensitivity about 
what the nature of theory is (or could be) in the field of 
strategic management. The author presents the view that 
strategy is part orderly and therefore is amenable to stip-
ulating causal mechanisms and it is also part "art" which 
will demand different thinking and methods. One example is 
given of a theory of business level strategy and research 
that could blend both views. A larger purpose is to make a 
call for having authors state clearly what the key features 
of their theories are so that open debate about them can 
be accomplished. 
TOWARD A THEORY OF BUSINESS LEVEL STRATEGY RESEARCH 
The term theory from the title above stems from the Greek word (theoria) 
which means enlightened reflection from a ground of a set of first premises. 
To the more modern thinker, the term theory usually suggests a structure of 
first premises, coupled with a set of causal laws or mechanisms such that if 
initial conditions are known, a conclusion can be made. For example, if we 
have 
1. Newton's Laws (Premise and Causal Laws) 
2. Position of the Seven Planets and the Relation to the Sun 
(Initial Conditions) 
Therefore, posit another planet - Neptune (Kuhn, 1957:261) 
The term strategy stems from the Greek word (strategos) meaning the art of the 
general. 
The three main terms presented in the definitions above - theory, strate-
~ and art - portray an underlying tension in the modern academic study of 
business strategy. The science in academic research ought to, if not, does 
strive for theories. Here, premises are laid open for inspection, causal laws 
are hypothesized from previous theory or hunches and then tested, so that rea-
soned, calculated and probability constrained conclusions can be drawn. The 
art in the definition of strategy, on the other hand, drives us to consider 
surprise, crisis, novelty, uniqueness, disorder and chaos-sort of an efferves-
cence which is ever in the process of becoming (May, 1975; Arieti, 1976). 
Therein is the tension: if theory drives us to consider what is orderly 
and art drives us to consider what is chaotic or disorderly, can there ever be 
a reconcilement? Does one necessarily preclude the other? In fact, if we are 
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to study that which is held to be the essence of strategy -- uniqueness as it 
relates to comparative advantage and distinctive image (Andrews, 1980; Hender-
son, 1983; South, 1980), then perhaps we need to be studying the renegades or 
outliers, (the "art"), and not the firms that will allow significant correla-
tions between two variables to be had. The writer feels that there are the 
pieces to begin to build a world view for strategy and strategy research that 
will ask us to develop theories - premises and causal laws - but will also 
allow us to consider the art within. In explicating these pieces certain no-
tions from the philosophy of science literature will be addressed. These con-
cerns follow naturally from considering the pieces. 
A. A Scheme for Strategy Research 
To hold that the study of strategy is one of art, is to hold, in the ex-
treme case, that no order or structure exists on which to build premises and 
causal laws. Subscribers to this position hold that surprise, crisis, etc. 
characterize reality better than an orderly state of affairs. However, the 
very notions of surprise, etc. presuppose some notion of order or regularity. 
Otherwise, "chaotic" (or "artistic··) conditions would be the order or the 
norm. So, the most fundamental premise that some order exists (or is thought 
to exist) that has a chance to be known seems inescapable, at least for West-
ern thinking. (Bourgeois, 1980; see Churchman, 1971 for a catalog of modes of 
rationality.) If this is true, then perhaps we can construe part of a theory 
of strategy (and strategy itself) to be lawlike and part as that which is ran-
dom, chaotic and ever in the process of becoming - a sort of effervescence. 
This can be seen as a derivative of Thompson's argument (1967) for the protec-
tion of the technical core. Figure 1 shows this notion graphically. Here, we 
have a nucleus of strategy that is thought to be lawlike - a dominant thrust 
that exists by virtue of the firm having successfully come to terms with the 
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FIGURE 1 





contingencies posed by the environment. A snapshot picture of this dominant 
thrust at any point in time for the successful firm would appear to respect 
tradition ("rules of the game," Porter, 1980) and the particular laws of the 
marketplace and environment that are germane to the firm's particular situa-
tion. Secondly, we have what the writer calls the diversionary scree.1 This 
notion and construct accommodates the art in strategy by being the apparatus 
that responds to newer, random, chaotic perhaps bizarre demands posed by the 
environment (Porter, 1980: Chapter 4). The topics of the dominant thrust and 
the diversionary scree will be taken up in greater detail in the next section, 
but what is proposed here is a dual structure of strategy formulation and per-
haps even implementation. The concerns of the dominant thrust point to a no-
tion that there needs to be a rather natural fit between strategy and the con-
tingencies posed by the environment. To use a natural analogy, the taproot 
and lifeblood of the firm's strategy (its dominant thrust) cannot be tampered 
with indiscriminately and must be cultivated through time. On the other hand, 
the concerns of the diversionary scree demand ephemeral, transitory sort of 
activity. This would respect the very nature of diversion and perhaps the 
term "art" if we understand it in its uniqueness and novelty meaning. 
Given these premises and arguments, what would be a way of thinking about 
building a theory of strategy? The cumulative implications of the above ana-
lysis would suggest that we consider the following: 
1. A definition of what is strategic. This should be couched in generic 
attribute terms so as to allow for guidance and the testing of causal 
mechanisms. 
2. Presentation of a relatively open and systemic model of strategy. 
This would, among other things, increase the probability of encom-
passing the requisite causal mechanisms. (See Bigler, 1983 for an 
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argument for construing strategy in more systemic terms and Hender-
son, 1983 for support of this argument.) 
3. The definition of what is strategic (1 above) and the specification 
of an open model for strategy (2 above) must also allow a statement 
of what theory of the firm is implied or posited. For example does a 
particular definition of what is strategic and its appropriate open 
model reflect a theory of the firm that says that management should 
maximize shareholder value (Copeland and Weston, 1983), or maximize 
presence in the marketplace (BCG) or minimize cost curves in terms of 
the factors of production (Coase, 1937). This up front construal of 
which theory of the firm a particular theory of strategy reflects 
could add to clarifying the ground or base of the theorist's endeav-
or. 
4. Isolate key causal mechanisms within this system that reflect the ge-
neric definition of what is strategic, then rigorously test for these 
causal mechanisms. This more ''basic" research, as opposed to "ap-
plied" research could form the building blocks to a more general 
theory of strategy. This will be relatively more detached and cir-
cumscribed research but it could be very foundational for our field. 
5. To be able to actually test the causal mechanisms, a way must be made 
to operationalize the key constructs in the systemic model. The con-
structs should be operationalized in terms of more abstract attri-
butes that will allow interval level measurement. For example, some 
way needs to be advanced to adequately measure such things as envi-
ronmental diversity, munificence and dynamism (Dess, 1980; Bigler, 
1982) and strategic diversity. For example, a frequency count of 
problematic environmental components could be done, but this would be 
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cumbersome and would not allow the testing of causal or correlational 
relationships. The relatively abstract attributes of environmental 
diversity, dynamism and abundance could, if properly operationalized, 
serve as proxies for actual environmental contingencies. This proce-
dure (for all parts of the model) could allow for interval (as op-
posed to nominal) level measurement and relational analysis. 
Figure 2 shows in schematic form what one theory of strategy would look 
like given the explication above. As one can see, this is a rather "natural-
ist" construal of a theory of strategy. No doubt other theories can be pre-
sented. What is intended here is to show a rather lean form in which theo-
rists can present in a clear and parsimonius manner what the underlying key 
features of their theories are. 
The above presentation may indicate a stable picture for strategy and 
strategy research. However, there exists a tradeoff in this presentation that 
needs to be respected in doing research (as indeed in actually doing strate-
gy). It is the omnipresence of risk that makes any theory of strategy at best 
dynamic and at worst unstable. There are two types of risk that are always 
borne in this strategic system. There is a risk that is borne in the dominant 
thrust. If the dominant thrust is a maximization construct and respects his-
toric tradition, then it sets itself up for the risk of catastrophic loss. 
There is a risk that a sudden shift in the environment may completely nullify 
a previously successful, internally consistent dominant thrust (see the HBS 
Case Service for examples of Winnebago or Vermont Tubbs). There is also risk 
that is borne by the diversionary scree. If this component of our system 
seeks optimal diversity, there is the risk that the firm may spread itself too 
thinly, even though conventional portfolio considerations have been designed 
appropriately. That is, the portfolio may be structured so that risk (here 
Figure 2 
AN EXAMPLE OF A THEORY OF STRATEGY 
GENERIC DEFINITION OF WHAT IS STRATEGIC: 
That which relates the firm to the contingencies posed by the environ-
ment. 
OPEN AND SYSTEMIC MODEL OF STRATEGY: 
Environment---->Strategy---->Performance 
KEY CAUSAL MECHANISMS: (Examples Only) 
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1. Internal Strategic Diversity should match environmental diversity for 
high performance and effectiveness. (Ashby, 1956.) 
2. Performance as measured by return on assets is inversely related to 
the amount of competition posed by the industry. (Porter, 1980.) 
3. Expected returns should be commensurate with risk. 
HOW TO OPERATIONALIZE STRATEGY: 







This maximization construct would suggest some sort of dominant thrust 
notion for strategy (Yavitz and Newman, 1982). One way to think about it 
would be in terms of a "fit" of the key sub-system components that go to make 
up the dominant thrust. This could be a fundamental clustering of the strate-
B!£ inputs of each of the traditional functional areas (marketing, finance, 
production, etc.). 
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measured as variance and covariance of historic returns) is appropriate for 
the level of return or that the overall sensitivity of the portfolio to the 
market is appropriate for the desired or expected return, but it may leave the 
portfolio too sparsely structured to be managed properly. Figure 3 shows this 
tradeoff. It reiterates the fact that some risk is always borne by the stra-
tegic system: in a dynamic environment, the solution probably lies in some 
sort of equilibrium through time. How this equilibrium is brought about is 
beyond the scope of this paper but it probably is a result of how well the 
management knows the actuality and intent of its own system and what the sen-
sitivity of that system is to changes in the environment. For example, do 
perceived strategy and structure coincide usefully with actual strategy and 
structure? Secondly, what has been the intent and actuality of management to 
change strategy and structure as the environment changes? This "reflexivity" 
requirement charges management with knowing their organizations in terms of 
not only the actuality of strategy and structure but also the intent of the 
thrust to align strategy and structure with the dictates of the environment. 
If this prescription is valid, then it brings choice (the ability to apper-
ceive usefully can be thought of as one of the inputs to choice [Nisbett and 
Ross, 1980]) squarely into our model and theory of strategic management. (See 
Aldrich, 1978 for a contrary argument.) Information systems, organizational 
culture, leadership style and the imposition of a super-ordinate goal are de-
sign variables that can be thought to enhance "reflexivity."* 
* The writer is working on a paper that will delve into the construct of 
reflexivity in more detail. 
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FIGURE 3 
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What does all of this mean for a theory of strategy research? The posi-
tion has been made here that any strategic apparatus is composed of dominant 
thrust and diversionary scree activity to help the firm protect itself from 
the contingencies posed by the environment. No matter what the tradeoff be-
tween the two modes of activity are, strategy content (by this "naturalist" 
account; Andrews, 1980) should maximize the actuality or the presentation of 
comparative advantage and distinctive image. Secondly, there is always some 
risk that is borne by this sytem; the risk of catastrophic loss and the risk 
of maximal diversity straining the administrative capability of management. 
If we necessarily need to understand this entire strategy apparatus as an open 
system, we have, as yet, no developed frameworks and techniques to help us in 
this regard. Henderson (1983) has sketched a program of what this would en-
tail, (industrial dynamics, Forester, 1963; biological evolutionary theory, 
Hirshleifer, 1978) but his is a first excursion and thereby rather sketchy. 
B. How the Model Might Relate to Practice 
Perhaps a brief overview of how the model might fit together would be, in 
order. This rather "naturalist" strategic system is seen as determining 
conventional criteria of effectiveness (such as market share), not the mere 
vehicle by which market share is enhanced. In other words, market share is 
the outcome of maneuvering this system through time and through the vicissi-
tudes posed by the environment --market share is not the raison d'etre of 
strategy (Abell, 1980). If this naturalist presentation is valid then the 
dominant thrust of core skills, comparative advantages and distinctive compe-
tences remain relatively enduring (for the successful firm) while feints (mar-
ket signalling), responding to legitimacy attacks, meeting diversity with di-
versity, etc., can be offered by the diversionary scree. As mentioned before, 
this diversionary scree can be thought of as all the rather ephemeral tactics 
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that a firm can employ, whether they be in marketing, finance or production. 
To illustrate some dynamics, if the dominant thrust would be moving in one di-
rection, the diversionary scree could be made to appear random, or could be 
thrown one for one against the contingencies posed by the environment or could 
be made to appear to move in the opposite direction. This would be diversion 
in the truest sense of the word. Following Thompson's argument then, the di-
versionary scree is what would take in and respond to most of the contingen-
cies posed by the environment. Following this naturalist line of reasoning, 
if the dominant thrust of the organization is ever compromised (CEO dying, ma-
jor technological shift or act of god) the firm should desist and employ its 
assets elsewhere. In this extreme state the firm could be classified as a 
"dead dog.•• But if the shock is absorbed by the diversionary scree, the firm 
could be taking losses but could be classified as a "living dog•• because its 
taproot of the dominant thrust has not been "cut•• or seriously compromised. 
In other words, the firm could still supply value to some set of stakeholders 
and if the firm is part of a corporate portfolio it should not be divested 
(Freeman, 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this article was to provide a discussion of what ~ theory 
of strategy and strategy research could look like. Its intent was to provide 
input for debate on where strategy research (or at least some part of scholar-
ly endeavor) could begin to move. The position was made that strategy re-
search should begin to move to building middle range theory. The interest is 
not so much on building theory for theory's sake, but that if theory is con-
strued as a position on: 
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1. A set of premises 
2. A set of causal laws 
3. Initial conditions 
4. Conclusions or prescriptions 
then the field can begin to test for causal laws (at whatever level of gener-
ality) and begin to move from anecdotal evidence to evidence that is more in 
line with making the field a discipline (by conventional standards). 
In a skeleton form, the position was made that a theory should begin with 
a definition of what is strategic, make premises known, present a relatively 
systemic model and make necessary the testing of causal mechanism and link-
ages. One example was given that considered strategy and the firm as a living 
organism that has certain characteristics -- a dominant thrust and a diver-
sionary scree in some sort of alignment with its environment. In this view, 
the system's integrity comes first, that is, its position in the marketplace 
cannot be ephemeral (although it can be weak in the case of a small or newer 
firm).2 Effectiveness measures such as market share, return on investment and 
perhaps even productivity and morale necessarily follow. If these arguments 
are valid, the following are suggested for strategy research: 
1. The constructs of dominant thrust and diversionary scree should be 
delved into separately when doing both content and process research. 
These two constructs may be fundamentally different in terms of long 
and short term durability (diversionary scree tactics are by their 
nature ephemeral) and their effects on long run profitability (diver-
sionary scree tactics will certainly decrease short run profits by 
protecting the dominant thrust). 
2. The process by which we come to understand the dynamics within the 
constructs of the dominant thrust and diversionary scree may be very 
different. Dominant thrust .activity for the older firm will allow, 
in fact demand, longitudinal research design. Diversionary scree 
tactics, being transitory, can probably only be approached by cross-
sectional designs. 
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These propositions may serve to untangle some of the problems in some past 
strategy research. If these constructs are in fact sufficiently different by 
nature, then mixing the two in the same operationalization of strategy may on-
ly produce confusion. In fact, these two constructs may be at cross purposes 
with one another. We need some appropriate theoretical and operational work 
to set boundaries on dominant thrust and diversionary scree activity. 
This view can certainly be debated, but at least we as a field can begin 
to have something to debate. Perhaps various schools of thought could emerge 
that could supply rallying points for good and healthy debate. Two schools 
were implicitly presented here - a "naturalist" school and a "randomness" 
school. No doubt other views and schools exist. Perhaps we could start mak-
ing premises explicit, developing theories arid schools of thought, and begin 
moving our field to discipline status, if this is indeed important. 
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ENDNOTES 
1The term scree is borrowed from Cattell's (1960) usage of the term as it 
applies to the Scree Test in factor analysis. Scree in actual usage is that 
rubble that falls down the side of a mountain and collects at its base. This 
author, like Cattell, is using this term for the visual aspects it conveys. 
2An ephemeral position in the marketplace, by this naturalist account, 
is one that develops from a lack of an internally consistent dominant thrust 
that does not align with the contingencies posed by the environment. Newer 
and perhaps smaller firms will not have had the occasion to be as entrenched 
as older firms, but in order to be viable, a "reflexive" management will be 
putting into place the dominant thrust capability early in the game. 
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